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As a conflict management strategy, mediation has offered a way to abate or 
resolve conflicts, and it is a solid alternative to escalating hostilities. Most academic 
works analyze mediation by studying the mediators’ roles and behavior, and such study is 
facilitated by the use of categories or typologies. This thesis seeks to identify an 
additional method known as the styles of mediation. Because international mediation has 
been used in terrorism conflicts, this thesis explores the styles of international mediation 
that have been employed in peace processes between states and terrorist organizations, 
and uses the Israeli-Palestinian, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lankan peace processes as case 
studies. 
 Two specific styles of mediation are suggested: personalistic mediation and 
institutionalized mediation, both strongly linked to the frameworks under which the 
mediation is exercised. Personalistic mediation is a framework of mediation that develops 
and establishes itself as the mediation unfolds, largely due to the mediators’ own work 
and determination. Institutionalized mediation takes place when an institution created in a 
peace process adopts a mediation strategy and exercises it under its institutional umbrella. 
The proposed styles may not only help analysts define frameworks in future mediations, 
but also compare mediation, and in some cases even predict—to an extent—patterns and 
results of mediation. 
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Which styles of international mediation have been employed in peace processes 
between states and terrorist organizations? The mediator acts as a third-party intervention 
accepted by the parties to a conflict; mediators intervene diplomatically in a conflict 
“with the stated purpose of contributing toward its abatement or resolution.”1 Although 
mediation—as a conflict management technique—seeks to peacefully resolve a conflict, 
not all terrorism conflicts have been ended through peace talks. Nevertheless, 
international mediation in peace talks between states and terrorist organizations has 
helped, for instance, to bring the negotiating parties to the table (such as in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process), provide a “safety net” during the talks (such as in the 
Northern Ireland peace process), and even modulate the violence in a conflict (such as in 
Sri Lanka with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).2 
A. STYLES OF MEDIATION 
Conflicting parties around the world still look to mediation to try to resolve their 
differences. Such negotiations also have a meaningful role—and track record—in 
combating terrorism. The armed conflict in Colombia that is, at the time of this writing, 
undergoing a peace process, provides a recent example of international mediation 
between a state and a terrorist organization. This conflict has lasted nearly 50 years and 
accounted for tens of thousands of deaths, as well as 25,000 people missing or 
disappeared, and more than 5 million people displaced.3 The Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which are the 
main armed groups in the Colombian conflict, have occasionally resorted to terrorism as 
a tactic.4 
                                                 
1 Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 4. 
2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 50, 65–6. 
3 June S. Beittel, Peace Talks in Colombia (CRS Report No. R42982) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2015), 2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf. 
4 Beittel, Peace Talks, 3, 10. 
 2 
Analysts point out that while the Colombian government has posted several 
notable military gains against the FARC in the last decade, “the FARC’s capability to 
revive itself and continue to threaten Colombia is considerable[;] . . . it cannot be readily 
overcome through military victory.”5 Among the other tools available to Colombia, talks 
between the parties seem increasingly important. The government sought a negotiated 
peace with the FARC unsuccessfully since 1982; in 2012, however, a fourth attempt to 
hold peace talks was launched, the first of its kind to give international mediators a 
significant role.6 The agreements between the conflicting parties have identified Cuba 
and Norway as “guarantors” and Venezuela and Chile as “accompaniers” of the peace 
process; while the United States is not an official mediator in the Colombian case, former 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson was 
appointed as a U.S. special envoy to the talks.7 
Audrey Kurth Cronin notes that only 18 percent of the terrorist groups that she 
surveyed engaged in negotiations over their fundamental aims, but of these talks, only 10 
percent failed.8 Still, she points out that measuring success in peace talks is not as easy as 
analyzing the peaceful settlement of disputes among, for example, states. Peace talks with 
terrorist organizations are conducted within an asymmetric relationship and generally 
“drag on, with interruptions, with setbacks, and without resolution, but also without 
outright failure.”9 Cronin argues that negotiations with terrorist organizations are not 
likely to end terrorism by themselves; rather, talks enable states to manage the terrorist 
threat and to facilitate the group’s deradicalization.10 
The quiet interest in—and promise of—international mediation in terrorism 
conflicts, as evidenced by the Colombian peace talks, offers room for reflection on the 
specific style of mediation that occurs in such processes. Much of the scholarly and 
                                                 
5 Beittel, Peace Talks, 8. 
6 Ibid., 14, 29. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
8 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 40–41. 
9 Ibid., 41. 
10 Ibid., 71–2. 
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practitioner analysis of mediation approaches the subject in terms of mediation strategies. 
Style is not quite the same thing as a mediation strategy or sponsor, however. The 
providers of mediation in the international system, as categorized by academics like J. 
Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, include “individuals, states, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and regional and global organizations.”11 In a similar—though 
simplified way—Karin Aggestam recognizes three main groups: “States, organizations, 
and individuals.”12  
 When categorizing structural styles of mediation, the literature usually presents 
two categories: mediations conducted by a single mediator, or multiparty mediations.13 
Single mediators, by definition, are those parties that act as the sole mediator in a given 
scenario; therefore, all of the above-mentioned providers of mediation may act as a single 
mediator in a given process. On the other hand, multiparty mediation refers to the 
presence of two or more mediators. Greig and Diehl note that “in multiparty mediation, 
third parties seek to broker an agreement in the conflict through either several 
uncoordinated efforts by different third parties, a coalition of third parties working 
together in a common mediation effort, or sequentially in separate mediation efforts over 
time.”14 
The present analysis of the styles of mediation employed in the conflicts between 
Israel and Palestine, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government, and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government suggests 
two specific styles of mediation in peace processes between states and terrorist 
organizations: 1) personalistic mediation and 2) institutionalized mediation. 
Personalistic mediation, often conducted by important individuals, has been 
frequently used in peace processes dealing with terrorism; the Sri Lankan and Israeli-
Palestinian peace processes are good analytical examples. Erik Solheim, a notable 
                                                 
11 J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, International Mediation (Malden, MA: Polity, 2012), 62. 
12 Karin Aggestam, “Quasi-Informal Mediation in the Oslo Channel: Larsen and Holst as Individual 
Mediators,” in Studies in International Mediation, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), 64. 
13 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 71. 
14 Ibid. 
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member of the Norwegian parliament, was a key mediator in the Sri Lankan conflict. In 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, high-profile mediation was conducted by the U.S. 
Secretaries of State George Shultz and James A. Baker III, Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Johan Jørgen Holst, and U.S. President Bill Clinton.15 
The second style of mediation, institutionalized mediation, involves the creation 
of an ad hoc institution during a peace process that adopts a mediation strategy. This style 
is most notable in the Northern Ireland case and in a more limited way, in the Sri Lankan 
case. The International Body and the Office of the Independent Chairmen created in 
Northern Ireland were essential for the initiation, development, and conclusion of the 
peace talks with the extremists in that region. With respect to the Sri Lankan conflict, the 
Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chairs—an institution which emerged in the Tokyo Conference on 
Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka in June 2003—exercised limited 
mediation in the peace talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, in 
addition to the official Norwegian mediation conducted by Solheim.16  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
While the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), even before the September 
2001 terror attacks against the United States, condemned terrorist acts “as criminal and 
unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, 
wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which could threaten 
international peace and security,”17 the 9/11 attacks prompted the international 
community to strengthen the Council’s role in combating terrorism. With Resolution 
1368, adopted on 12 September 2001, the UNSC began to regard “any act of international 
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.”18 Similarly, international 
                                                 
15 These mediation examples are addressed in Chapter II of this thesis. 
16 Maria Groeneveld-Savisaar and Siniša Vuković, “Terror, Muscle, and Negotiation: Failure of 
Multiparty Mediation in Sri Lanka,” in Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy, ed. I. 
William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 
126. 
17 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1269 (1999) on the Responsibility of the 
Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
18 UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001) Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist 
Acts. 
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terrorism is also considered an international crime under international law, which even 
classifies terrorism as a war crime or a crime against humanity under certain 
circumstances.19  
The nature of international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security 
and as an international crime inevitably requires the involvement of the international 
community. While such involvement may come as military support against the terrorists, 
the international community may also support the state—without violating the principle 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states—by welcoming its decision to engage 
in negotiations with terrorist organizations or by even offering assistance with a given 
conflict management strategy.20 
As such, states that choose to address terrorism through a peaceful conflict 
management strategy will inescapably encounter the dilemma of whether they should 
welcome international mediators in the process and under which frameworks. Because 
international mediation in negotiations between states and terrorist organizations is not 
unprecedented, the analysis of past experiences could shed light on styles of mediation 
employed by these intermediaries and help policymakers identify the forms that such 
presence may adopt in attempting to mediate their country’s conflict.  
The Israeli-Palestinian, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lankan peace processes can be 
used as case studies because they received—under different circumstances and levels of 
participation—international support, including mediation, to manage the conflict.21 
Although these three conflicts have been thoroughly studied and the literature on general 
mediation is vast, there are fewer academic accounts of the international mediation 
undertaken in these cases. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive academic study 
categorizing the styles of international mediation in peace processes between states and 
terrorist organizations.  
                                                 
19 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 450. 
20 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 41. As scholars point out, “there are no sovereignty 
barriers to offering mediation assistance.” 
21 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 65–6. 
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Consequently, this thesis attempts to shed light on international mediation in these 
terrorism cases and draw conclusions on the most common styles of third-party 
mediation. While there is no golden rule of international mediation in these types of 
conflicts—because each peace process is configured according to its particular context—
mediation policy analysts could find this study helpful for defining frameworks in future 
peace processes. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
International law is based on the notion that its subjects create the norms, oversee 
compliance, and sanction the violators among them. Although terrorist organizations are 
not and cannot be considered formal subjects of international law as their illegal nature 
contradicts the foundations of the system itself, they are nevertheless important actors in 
international relations due to the transnational effects of their activities.22 There is a 
scholarly consensus that states combating terrorism should employ a dual strategy: 
carrots and sticks. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson conclude their study of 13 states’ 
counterterrorism strategies noting that combating terrorism is more effective when 
governments “address the underlying factors that gave rise to terrorism in the first place, 
in conjunction with the use of effective coercive policies.”23 Part of the carrot strategy 
consists of political engagement, which also includes conflict management methods such 
as negotiations undertaken during peace processes.24  
Given the importance of international law principles in international relations, the 
analysis of the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes between states can provide 
an insight into the conflict management methods generally available for policy-makers.25 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, as synthesized by I. William Zartman, 
                                                 
22 Heber Arbuet-Vignali, email to author, 25 February 2015. The primary subjects of international law 
are states, followed by other subjects with limited legal capacity such as international organizations, 
insurgents, and national liberation movements. See Cassese, International Law, 72, 150. Evidently, terrorist 
groups do not possess the characteristics that enable states to participate in the international system. 
23 Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, “Conclusion,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism, eds. 
Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 564–
5. 
24 Ibid., 577. 
25 Cassese, International Law, 58. 
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recognizes “three basic methods for the peaceful management of international conflicts[:] 
. . . 1) direct negotiation among the conflicting parties; 2) various forms of mediation, 
good offices and conciliation; and 3) binding methods of third-party intervention (e.g., 
arbitration and adjudication).”26  
The role of an intermediary in a non-judicial procedure comes to play in good 
offices, conciliation, and mediation. Saadia Touval differentiates between the three 
approaches based on the level of involvement of the intermediary in the negotiations.27 
Good offices are performed when the intermediary’s role is limited to the communication 
between the adversaries. If the intermediary also influences the parties to make 
concessions and delineates the bargaining setting, it is acting as a conciliator.  
Intermediaries become mediators once they “make suggestions pertaining to the 
substance of the conflict, and seek to influence the parties to make concessions by 
exerting pressures and offering incentives.”28 Touval writes that “mediation is the most 
versatile of intermediaries’ roles, and may subsume the roles of good offices and 
conciliation.”29 When studying the theory and practice of mediation, Kyle Beardsley also 
characterizes conciliation “as a specific style of mediation,” due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing the roles of intermediaries in certain situations.30 
I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure point out that, from the state’s 
perspective, “engaging extremists . . . works as part of a broad policy that is complex in 
tactics, deliberate in balance, and, ultimately, indispensable.”31 Such indispensability also 
figures in Cronin’s observation that “virtually all democratic governments facing terrorist 
                                                 
26 I. William. Zartman, “Mediation in International Conflicts: Theory, Practice, and Development,” in 
Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 66. 
27 Touval, Peace Brokers, 4. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Kyle Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 18. 
31 I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, “Introduction,” in Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, 
Timing, and Diplomacy, eds. I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 2. 
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campaigns have been forced to negotiate at some point.”32 Nigel Quinney and A. Heather 
Coyne, from the United States Institute of Peace, note that even the United States, which 
has publicly claimed that it does not and will not negotiate with terrorists, has actually 
“talked with the leaders of terrorist organizations in detail and at length about their 
political goals and the make-up of their negotiations.”33 The difference between word 
and deed has its own sense, however; Zartman and Faure argue that a state should not 
acknowledge its willingness to negotiate with terrorist organizations lest it open itself to 
blackmail.34 
Daniel Byman as well as Zartman and Faure point out that talks between states 
and terrorist organizations imply risks and benefits to both parties. Because the state is 
usually the party that seeks the talks, it is regarded as the weaker side of the negotiation. 
Moreover, negotiating with the terrorist organization grants it recognition related to its 
legitimacy and status. On the other hand, the authors note that risks do not overweigh the 
potential positive outcomes of talking to terrorists, and list some of the benefits that states 
experienced in past conflicts: gathering information on the terrorists, influencing the 
terrorist group’s behavior, ending the conflict or the group’s terrorism strategy, and 
sending a peaceful message to the international community.35  
In addition, Cronin also shows that tactical benefits are also important for states, 
such as possibly achieving short-term pauses and dividing the terrorist group’s 
constituency into factions.36 As for the terrorist groups, negotiating with the state benefits 
them because they gain “status and representational recognition,”37 and also allows them 
                                                 
32 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 35. 
33 Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne, eds., Talking to Groups That Use Terror (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 5–6. 
34 I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, “Conclusion,” in Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, 
Timing, and Diplomacy, eds. I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 287. 
35 Zartman and Faure, “Introduction,” 4–16; Daniel Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with 
Terrorists: Lessons for Policymakers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (2006): 412–15, doi: 
10.1080/10576100600703996. 
36 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 37–8. 
37 Zartman and Faure, “Introduction,” 6. 
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to pursue “causes related to control of territory.”38 For the terrorists, negotiations imply 
tactical and strategic risks, such as being unable to pursue their causes through peaceful 
political means once they resign violence.39 
Scholars’ recommendations for negotiating with terrorists vary in their extent. For 
Cronin, the government should “negotiate officially only when it becomes clear that the 
cause is gaining popular support or legitimacy, either through the actions of the group or 
clumsy counteractions by the government;” she also notes that the government should 
analyze the terrorist groups in a comprehensive way, both culturally and historically.40 
Zartman and Faure seem to have a broader perspective on negotiating with terrorists, and 
they recommend negotiating whenever possible to drive the terrorist groups away from 
violence as means of achieving their goals.41 Daniel Byman cautions policy-makers 
about the possible characteristics of terrorist groups that play against the odds of 
successful negotiations; he notes that governments should avoid initiating talks with 
terrorist groups that, due to their nature and context, may actually come out stronger if 
the government seeks negotiation. Nevertheless, Byman does acknowledge that 
negotiations “are often necessary for ending conflicts and transforming a terrorist group 
into a legitimate political actor or driving them out of the terrorism business 
altogether.”42  
Scholars also recognize that negotiating with some terrorist groups such as al-
Qaeda is unrealistic. Zartman and Faure consider al-Qaeda to be beyond the reach of 
engagement.43 Cronin says that al-Qaeda’s leadership cannot be dealt with because of its 
extreme propositions that constitute nonnegotiable terms, indiscriminate violence, and 
                                                 
38 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 40–1. 
39 Camille Pecastaing, “Facing Terrorism: Engagement and De-escalation,” in Engaging Extremists: 
Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy, eds. I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 196. 
40 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 41–2. 
41 Zartman and Faure, “Conclusion,” 278–9, 287. 
42 Byman, “Decision to Begin Talks,” 412. 
43 Zartman and Faure, “Introduction,” 2. 
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because “they are unresponsive to their broader constituency,” but she does suggest 
exploring the potential of talks with global affiliates of al-Qaeda.44 
While scholars’ views of when to initiate negotiations with terrorist groups may 
vary slightly, there is a general consensus that third-party mediation improves the talks’ 
prospects for success. Cronin argues that mediation can generally create a “safety net,” 
moderate violence, and help initiate the talks.45 Touval notes that even if a conflict is 
sometimes too complex for mediators to resolve, such as the one between Israel and the 
Palestinians, mediators can contribute to the evolution of a peace process by helping 
“conclude ‘small’ agreements reducing the conflict.”46 Art and Richardson also highlight 
the importance of mediation in the Oslo Accords between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, as well as the Good Friday Agreement in the Northern Ireland conflict.47 
Zartman and Faure regard mediation between states and terrorist groups as “generally 
necessary.”48 Kyle Beardsley, who suggests the prudence of mediation in peace 
processes, even notes that “mediation can be strictly better—to the disputing parties as 
well as to the international community—than the alternative of escalating hostilities.”49 
Neutrality is not required of mediators. In fact, self-interest of mediators does 
increase the prospects of successful mediation, as shown by Maria Groeneveld-Savisaar 
and Siniša Vuković50 as well as Beardsley51 and Touval.52 According to Beardsley, the 
incentives that motivate third-parties to mediate are: direct benefits that can be obtained if 
the conflict is resolved, such as avoiding an eventual refugee crisis; humanitarian values; 
                                                 
44 Cronin, “When Should We Talk to Terrorists?” (United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 
240, May 2010) ProQuest (868222573), 10, 12. 
45 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 65–6. 
46 Touval, Peace Brokers, 331. 
47 Art and Richardson, “Conclusion,” 579. 
48 Zartman and Faure, “Introduction,” 12. 
49 Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma, 178. 
50 Groeneveld-Savisaar and Vuković, “Terror, Muscle, and Negotiation,” 107, 109–10. 
51 Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma, 51. 
52 Touval, Peace Brokers, 16. 
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and receiving important benefits from mediation, such as enhancing their international 
relevance.53 
D. THE CASE STUDIES 
This thesis analyzes the styles of international mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian, 
Northern Ireland, and Sri Lankan peace processes. The background of the conflicts and 
their development will not be specifically addressed in this thesis, given the limited focus 
of this work. Should readers want to address additional topics, they are encouraged to 
consult the vast amount of academic literature that covers those aspects of the conflicts. 
1. Introduction to the Sri Lankan Case
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil 
minority gave rise to several ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, most notably the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE engaged in an active war against the 
government of Sri Lanka from 1976 until 19 May 2009, when the Sri Lanka Armed 
Forces announced their military defeat after having killed the LTTE’s leader, Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, the day before.54 While this conflict that ended in a military defeat is 
commonly analyzed in terrorism studies, it is also used by mediation academics because 
of the third parties’ attempt to bring peace to the conflict. 
During the conflict, the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE participated in 
four rounds of negotiations. The first three rounds—which took place from 8 July 1985 to 
17 August 1985, 3 May 1989 to June 1990, and 13 October 1994 to 18 April 1995—were 
direct talks between the government and LTTE.55 In February 2000, Sri Lankan 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the LTTE’s leader Prabhakaran “formally 
53 Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma, 24. 
54 Thomas A. Marks, “Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” in Democracy and 
Counterterrorism, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2007), 485, 488 ; Jonathan Goodhand and Benedikt Korf, “Caught in the Peace Trap?,” in 
Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap?, ed. Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan 
Spencer, and Benedikt Korf (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1. 
55 Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis July 2006 –May 2009, 
28–29, http://www.defence.lk/news/20110801_Conf.pdf. 
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requested Norwegian government assistance in facilitating peace talks.”56 Consequently, 
a fourth peace attempt began on 21 February 2002, but it was stalled by 2003 and came to 
an end in 2006 after failed attempts to revitalize the talks.57 
In addition to Norwegian mediation, other third parties also played notable roles 
in the conflict. Although India did not have an active mediation role in the conflict, in 
July 1987 the governments of India and Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Lanka Accord which 
established, among other things, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to “enforce the 
cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms” of the Tamil militant groups.58 The role 
of the IPKF in the conflict was short-lived: The troops left Sri Lanka in 1990 after failing 
to make the LTTE surrender its arms.59 From this point, India would adopt a “hands-off 
policy” in the conflict.60 Nevertheless, India showed support for the peace process and it 
was regularly informed and often consulted by the governments of Sri Lanka and Norway 
throughout the mediated peace process.61 
Other third parties also played additional roles: the United States, Japan, the 
European Union, and—again—Norway materialized their involvement in the peace 
process through the Co-Chairs, an institution created at the Tokyo Conference on 
Reconstruction and Development in Sri Lanka in June 2003.62 This institution’s role in 
the peace process will be studied in Chapter III. 
56 Goodhand and Korf, “Peace Trap,” 5. 
57 Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, “Humanitarian Operation” ; Groeneveld-Savisaar and Vuković, 
“Terror, Muscle, and Negotiation,” 116. 
58 Chanaka Talpahewa, Peaceful Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts: Norwegian Involvement in the 
Sri Lankan Peace Process (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015), 44. 
59 Ibid., 45. 
60 S. I. Keethaponcalan, “The Indian Factor in the Peace Process and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka,” 
in Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap?, Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan 
Spencer, and Benedikt Korf, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 41. 
61 Ibid., 43–4. 
62 Groeneveld-Savisaar and Vuković, “Terror, Muscle, and Negotiation,” 126. 
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2. Introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian Case
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of the bigger Arab-Israeli conflict. While 
peace processes have taken place between many of the conflicting parties in the region, 
this thesis is limited to the study of the peace process between Israel and Palestine 
because of its link to terrorism. As with the Sri Lankan case, the background of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its developments will not be specifically addressed. 
This study focuses on the peace process between Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) because of the latter’s organizational links to terrorism. 
Moreover, the study also focuses on the PLO—and not other Palestinian terrorist 
organizations—because the PLO ultimately became the central terrorist organization with 
which Israel negotiated, and also because the PLO was ultimately recognized as the 
representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO was formed in 1964 but it was not until 
1968 that the organization’s charter “was amended to reflect the ideology of militant 
groups like Fatah, which advocated Palestinian-initiated ‘armed struggle’ against Israel as 
the main vehicle for the liberation of Palestine.”63 The PLO renounced terrorism in 1988, 
it was de-listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in 1994, and it 
reformed its charter in 1996—by, among other things, including the recognition of 
Israel’s right to exist—as a result of the advancement of the peace process in those 
years.64 
The significance of the PLO’s renunciation of terrorism by Yasser Arafat in 1988 
deserves a special analysis. In her study of nationalistic terrorist organizations (NTO), 
Stacie L. Pettyjohn notes that “even when an NTO’s leader has repudiated terrorism, as 
Arafat did in 1988, such proclamation does not ensure that the leadership will actually 
63 Glenn E. Robinson, “Palestine Liberation Organization,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic 
World, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed 4 January 2016, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/
article/opr/t236/e0618. 
64 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. 
3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 284–5 ; Michael Moran, “Terrorist Groups and 
Political Legitimacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 16 March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/
terrorism/terrorist-groups-political-legitimacy/p10159; Yasser Arafat, “Palestine Liberation Organization: 
Arafat Letter of Assurance Affirming Changes in the PLO Charter,” Jewish Virtual Library, American-
Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 13 January 1998, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/
ArafatCharterAssurance.html.  
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stop using violence or try to restrain others within the organization from doing so.”65 She 
continues: 
The NTO’s renunciation of violence needs to be permanent, meaning that 
its members internalize the norms of compromise and nonviolence. 
Otherwise, there is no guarantee that if the circumstances change, the 
terrorists will not again resort to terrorism. This situation occurred at the 
outset of the second intifada, when many members of the PLO, who had 
abstained from violence since 1993, resumed their attacks against Israel.66  
It is true—though beyond the scope of this analysis—that PLO members 
occasionally resorted to terrorism after these institutional changes. The formal 
repudiation of terrorism as a means of pressing the PLO’s agenda still marks a major 
development in the conflict and its resolution. Indeed, the renunciation made in 1988 
along with two other landmark factors—specifically, the de-listing of the PLO as a 
terrorist organization and the PLO’s charter reform—speak directly to the topic of this 
study. 
Terrorism and the PLO’s charter reform were key topics during the peace talks 
between Israel and the PLO, up until Camp David II. While this thesis acknowledges the 
existence of other mediated peace attempts between the conflicting parties beyond that 
stage, it also notes that the negotiating agenda between Israel and Palestine is much larger 
and covers other significant and mostly historical discussions, with which this thesis is 
not fundamentally concerned. 
3. Introduction to the Northern Ireland Case
While the ethno-nationalist nature of the Northern Ireland conflict can be traced 
as far as to centuries, terrorism emerged in the region with the creation of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA or simply IRA) in 1970. Northern Ireland was divided into 
two communities when the terrorism conflict or “troubles,” as they were called, emerged: 
The Catholic or nationalist side, which included those regarded as republicans, i.e., 
65 Stacie L. Pettyjohn, “U.S. Policy toward Nationalistic Terrorist Organizations: Isolate or Engage?,” 
in Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy, ed. I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier 
Faure (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 150–1. 
66 Ibid., 151. 
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nationalist paramilitaries, such as the IRA; and the unionist or Protestant side, which also 
included those who were regarded as loyalists due to their membership in Ulster 
paramilitary groups.67 On one side, unionists and loyalists sought to remain inside the 
United Kingdom; on the other, nationalists and republicans sought to withdraw from the 
United Kingdom and unite Ireland under one single state.68  
While the Irish Republican Army had been an active paramilitary force against 
the unionists and British since the partition of Ireland in the 1920s, the group was not 
militarily active by the 1960s, when Catholics took to the streets with demands for civil 
rights and were repressed by the local unionist government. Recognizing the need to fill a 
gap of representing nationalistic interests, part of the historic IRA membership formed 
the PIRA in 1970 and presented itself to the Catholics as their defenders. The 
Provisionals, as they were called, or simply the IRA—from 1970s onward—proposed to 
end the minority’s suffering by establishing an independent and united Ireland, thus 
rejecting British rule over Northern Ireland and unionists’ desire to remain as part of the 
United Kingdom.69 The “troubles” went through three periods of violence: a quick 
escalation of violence between 1968 and 1972, constant levels of intense violence 
between 1972 and 1976, and a de-escalation period between 1976 and the consolidation 
of the Belfast Agreement or Good Friday Agreement in 1998.70 
Throughout the years, the British government resorted to “all the traditional 
instruments of the state—military, police, intelligence, legal and political—to try to bring 
about a permanent end to the violence.”71 Nevertheless, “the military soon realized that 
in spite of its extraordinary asymmetry in manpower, it could not defeat the IRA 
militarily.” Richardson writes that “it was this realization, reluctantly arrived at, that 
                                                 
67 Macmillan Dictionary, s.v. “Ulster,” accessed 24 June 2015, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/
dictionary/british/ulster. Ulster is a synonym for Northern Ireland, primarily used by unionists. 
68 Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism, ed. Robert J. Art 
and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 67. 
69 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 68.  
70 Ibid., 70. 
71 Ibid., 76. 
16 
motivated efforts to seek a political solution.”72 Consequently, the British government 
initiated secret talks with the IRA in 1972 and undertook efforts to find a political 
agreement in seven occasions between 1974 and 1994.73 The last effort took place when 
the Taoiseach Albert Reynolds—head of government of the Irish Republic— and the 
British Prime Minister John Major, issued on 15 December 1993 a joint declaration that 
established the terms under which Northern Irish paramilitary groups could enter in 
negotiations with the governments, thus setting a “starting point of a peace process 
designed to culminate in a political settlement.”74 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
States facing the decision to talk to terrorist groups do not only address the 
questions of why and when to talk, but also how to do so. Among the different conflict 
management strategies, the conflicting parties may choose international mediation to 
resolve their differences. The characteristics of the mediation conducted during a peace 
process will not only depend on the agreed framework for mediation between the parties, 
but also on the style of mediation by the provider.  
While the nature of the provider does not always correspond to the style of 
mediation conducted, since different providers may conduct the mediation with a similar 
style, evidence suggests that individual mediators (whether officials or private 
individuals) are more likely to adopt a personalistic style of mediation. Moreover, 
different types of providers may create and integrate an ad hoc institution in a peace 
process to mediate between the conflicting parties. 
Most academic works analyze mediation by studying the mediators’ roles and 
behavior, and such study is facilitated by the use of categories or typologies. This thesis 
seeks to identify an additional method—known as the styles of mediation—for predicting 
results of mediation and comparing mediation cases. 
72 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 78. 
73 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 43. 
74 George J. Mitchell, Making Peace (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 17–8; 
“Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration, Wednesday 15 December 1993,” Conflict 
Archive on the Internet, University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm. 
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II. PERSONALISTIC MEDIATION 
The need of official individuals to conduct their work in accordance with the 
interests of their states may leave little room for personal interests, but as this chapter 
makes clear, the personal interest of individuals does play an important role in the 
mediation context. For example, U.S. mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s was a clear manifestation of American policy, and 
therefore it can be argued that the United States was a state mediator in the conflict. 
President Bill Clinton, however, was a key figure in some phases of the mediation, and 
due to his personal effort and interest it can also be argued that the mediation—especially 
at the Wye River Summit and Camp David II—was largely conducted by an individual 
mediator.  
The mediation literature usually simplifies the categories of providers of 
mediation into three types: states, organizations, and individuals. Even though scholar 
Karin Aggestam notes J. Z. Rubin’s observation that “all mediation entails the work of 
individuals,”75 she emphasizes that individuals represent a separate category and that 
they can be divided among “informal mediators (private individuals/scholars) and formal 
mediators (official individuals).”76 While Aggestam does not go any further with her 
distinction, the official status of individual mediators would seem to derive from their 
inextricable relation to either a state or an international organization.77 An analysis of the 
categorization made by J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl suggests that the distinction 
between states and official individuals lies in the type of interest behind the mediation—
                                                 
75 J. Z. Rubin, “Conclusion: International Mediation in Context,” in Mediation in International 
Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, ed. Jacob Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1992) quoted in Aggestam, “Quasi-Informal Mediation,” 64–5. 
76 Aggestam, “Quasi-Informal Mediation,” 65. 
77 Ibid. When talking about organizations as a category of mediators, Aggestam makes the distinction 
between of intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, stating that the first 
conduct formal mediation, while the latter often conduct informal mediation. Her analysis implies a 
reference to the status of subjects of international law.  
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whether a state’s public policy is at issue or whether it is more a product of personal 
interest of the mediator.78 
Greig and Diehl’s work, which focuses on mediation in the international system 
in general, also addresses the case of what the authors call private mediators, who are 
“individuals with significant experience in government service, leadership in religious 
organizations, or key positions within prominent international organizations.”79 Former 
President Jimmy Carter’s mediation efforts—after he had left office—in the Eritrean War 
of Independence fall under this heading.80 When referring to the characteristics of this 
type of mediation, the authors mention that “private individuals rely extensively on their 
personal prestige and diplomatic skills given that they lack the resources and elements of 
material power that would allow them to offer carrots and sticks to the disputants, or to 
provide any guarantee to the parties for any settlement that might be reached.”81  
Even though Greig and Diehl do not mention any case of private mediators in 
terrorism conflicts, it is clear that private individuals’ mediation shares the same 
characteristics of the personalistic style of mediation addressed in this chapter, with the 
exception that the mediation studied here was conducted by officials, not private 
individuals. Consequently, Greig and Diehl’s reference to private mediators’ drawbacks 
does not apply here, given that mediators in terrorism conflicts have indeed been official 
mediators; due to their official status, they had more resources, leverage, and guarantees 
at their disposal than a simple individual not linked to a state or international 
organization. Nevertheless, the authors’ stress on an individual mediator’s personal 
reputation and skillfulness does align with the characteristics of personalistic mediation 
analyzed in this chapter. 
In sum, this chapter will study the characteristics of the personalistic style of 
mediation, which may be found by highlighting the personal interest, efforts, and 
                                                 
78 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 64–5 (my interpretation). 




leadership in mediation between states and terrorist organizations. The Sri Lankan and 
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts will be used to analyze this style of mediation. 
A. MEDIATION IN THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT 
Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka was officially regarded as facilitation by 
both conflicting parties and Norway itself.82 Emphasis is generally not placed on the role 
of facilitators themselves, but rather on the Royal Norwegian government and its 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; indeed, Norwegian facilitation was welcomed into the peace 
process because both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE regarded Norway as an 
overall suitable country for conducting the mediation.83 Therefore, the first choice made 
was regarding the country and not specific individuals. Nevertheless, as this section 
shows, the facilitation carried out by the Norwegians could be described as personalistic. 
Erik Solheim’s involvement in Sri Lanka began well before the official request 
came to facilitate the conflict. As reports show, Solheim—a Norwegian Member of 
Parliament—had spent some time writing his autobiography in early 1998 in the house of 
former Norwegian politician Arne Fjørtoft, in Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka. Later 
that year, Solheim—who had recently resigned as the head of the Socialist Left Party—
found himself immersed in the conflict when the LTTE requested his help to obtain 
foreign medical treatment for the top-ranking LTTE representative, Anton 
Balasingham.84 A study by Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, and Gunnar Sørbø notes that 
“after lengthy, top secret explorations with Sri Lankan officials, this [was] achieved and 
it [was] on this occasion that Norway [was] asked by Balasingham to take on the role as 
facilitator.”85 Consequently, the already existing Norwegian links to the conflict that had 
                                                 
82 Talpahewa, Peaceful Intervention, 68. For the purposes of this thesis, facilitation will be understood 
as a type of mediation, along with formulation and manipulation. This categorization, which is used by 
scholars analyzing the Norwegian facilitation in Sri Lanka, was put forward by Saadia Touval and I. 
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83 Talpahewa, Peaceful Intervention, 72–83. 
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been built—in one way or another—throughout the 1990s, had now placed Solheim in 
the frontline of the events on the Norwegian side.86 
Solheim also began establishing a relationship with the government of Sri Lanka. 
Scholar Chanaka Talpahewa argues that Solheim “was acceptable” to Sri Lanka by mid-
1999 and, as a result, he was designated as “Special Envoy to the Peace Process in Sri 
Lanka in March 2000.”87 The author highlights that “the fact that Solheim had visited Sri 
Lanka in 1998, had studied the country for over two years, and had built up his contacts 
among some of the stakeholders to the conflict may have had a bearing on his 
appointment.”88 Hence, Solheim’s personal attributes—built on his knowledge and 
association with the politics and people in Sri Lanka during the late 1990s—can be 
deemed the foundation for his involvement in the peace process in the following years. 
The importance of Solheim as a key figure in the facilitation can also be analyzed 
due to his standing throughout the peace process. Although the conflicting parties 
approved Solheim’s role, his figure did not escape from controversy. Though Solheim 
often relied on the Norwegian Ambassador to Colombo, Jon Westborg, Solheim himself 
was the central person in the facilitation.89 But by June 2001 Solheim’s role and 
reputation was questioned by President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her Foreign 
Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, who met with then Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Thorbjørn Jagland and requested Norway to “upgrade” its facilitation role.90 
Such controversy arose from, first, what scholars identify as “a general perception 
that Solheim was too accessible to the media and that much of what he was sharing with 
the journalists was not helpful to the commencement of negotiations,” and second, his 
apparent close connections to the LTTE.91 Consequently, Jagland agreed with 
                                                 
86 Goodhand et al., “Pawns of Peace,” 29–31. 
87 Talpahewa, Peaceful Intervention, 91. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 125” ; Vidar Helgesen and Erik Solheim, “The Straight Talkers,” in Kings of Peace, Pawns of 
War: The Untold Story of Peace-Making, ed. Harriet Martin (New York: Continuum, 2006), 120–1. 
90 Talpahewa, Peaceful Intervention, 114. 
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Kamaratunga to remove Solheim from his role, but the LTTE’s opposition to the decision 
finally helped him remain in the process; however, “the team [was] headed by State 
Secretary Raymond Johansen, who [was] soon replaced by Vidar Helgesen following the 
September 2001 elections in Norway.”92 Hence, Norway “upgraded” its mission by 
incorporating more high-ranking Norwegians in the process. Meanwhile, Solheim—
facing controversy—was saved by his reputation and importance in the facilitation, at 
least in the eyes of the LTTE. 
As noted, Solheim did not only face and survive the Sri Lankan political 
controversy, but also weathered more political uncertainty following the elections in both 
Sri Lanka and Norway. During her term and until the elections of December 2001, 
President Kumaratunga (from the People’s Alliance) had worked alongside prime 
ministers who were political allies; however, those elections marked a government shift. 
Ranil Wickremesinghe (from the oppositionist United National Front) became Prime 
Minister. By building a relationship with Wickremesinghe and his party months before 
the election, Solheim had managed to gain the new Prime Minister’s trust; this trust may 
have been an important factor for his permanence in the process.93 
Additionally, there was a change in Norway’s domestic political leadership in 
2001. Talpahewa highlights: 
The resignation of the incumbent government of Norway in September 
2001 did not have a significant impact on its role in Sri Lanka. The new 
coalition government of Conservatives and Christian Democrats, led by 
Prime Minister Bondevik, continued with Solheim as Special Envoy, with 
Foreign Minister Jan Petersen and Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar 
Helgesen in charge of the Sri Lankan peace process. By continuing with 
Solheim, who had already established himself with the two main parties, 
as well as some of the other stakeholders in the conflict in Sri Lanka, 
Norway ensured the continuity of its involvement and gave a clear 
message that a change of government in Norway would not affect its role 
as facilitator.94 
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While Talpahewa attributes the role of facilitator to Norway as a country rather 
than to Solheim himself, his characterization of Solheim can be regarded as a connection 
to personalistic mediation. Even though Solheim was not the only facilitator anymore, the 
confirmation of Solheim’s role by the new government, despite the political change, 
speaks about his importance in the process. Though Helgesen became the head of the 
facilitation team, Solheim was “in charge of the daily running of the process.”95 
Indeed, Helgesen complemented the status of the Norwegian facilitation team. 
Solheim’s and Helgesen’s account of the events that led to the upgrading of the team 
notes that Kumaratunga did not want to end the Norwegian facilitation in June 2001 but 
rather “upgrade their involvement, saying she felt that a more senior level of engagement 
could get things kick-started.”96 The facilitators mention that Helgesen’s status and rank 
as a Minister of State was “tremendously important for both parties: For the Tigers, it 
[had] been a proxy recognition because Helgesen [represented] a government; for the Sri 
Lankan government negotiators, three of whom were themselves ministers, it was a 
question of their own status and respect.”97 A Sri Lankan government team member said 
of Helgesen: “For our side, the fact he was a minister helped immensely. He had the 
status.”98  
Hence, Helgesen’s rank in the Norwegian government could be interpreted as a 
complement to Solheim’s status in the peace process. Both facilitators note that “the 
public image of the Norwegian’s [sic] peace mediation is unusual in that it is not a one-
man band but a two-man show. . . Helgesen is keen to stress the importance of the team 
in the Norwegian’s [sic] approach to peace mediation.”99 Nevertheless, Solheim 
remained deeply involved in the process—unlike Helgesen—after subsequent political 
change in Norway. 
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97 Ibid., 114. 
98 Ibid. 
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The new Norwegian government inaugurated in 2005 brought some changes: 
“Helgesen [left] office, Solheim [became] Minister of International Development, and in 
March 2006 Jon Hanssen-Bauer [took] his place as Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.”100 
Though no longer special envoy, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry noted that Solheim 
would still “lead the work, visit Sri Lanka regularly, and be responsible for Norway’s role 
as facilitator of the peace process.”101 Again, Solheim remained as the key facilitator in 
the peace process. 
One of the central pieces of the peace process and Norway’s involvement was the 
Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE 
on 22 February 2002. While most academics praise Norway’s role in the signing of the 
CFA, there is no scholarly consensus regarding Norway’s efforts in implementing the 
agreement. On the one hand, Talpahewa argues that “although the CFA brought about a 
temporary truce, resulting in a significant reduction of battle-related deaths and a 
semblance of normalcy in the conflict-affected areas, it did not move beyond this initial 
stage.”102 On the other hand, Audrey K. Cronin believes that Norway’s involvement in 
the process “was probably the main reason why violence was modulated there at all.”103  
Such differences regarding Norway’s role after the CFA was signed may be 
linked to the various assessments of Norway’s role throughout the peace process. 
Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka took three forms: as the official mediator, as a 
member of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (an institution created by the CFA and 
mandated to monitor the cease-fire), and as a Co-Chair of the Sri Lanka Donor Group (an 
institution that is studied in Chapter III of this thesis). Indeed, Talpahewa analyses the 
overall Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka and not just the official mediation. 
Consequently, Solheim’s role as a mediator may tend to be overshadowed by the 
shortcomings of Norwegian involvement in other areas. The Norwegian mediation was 
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not only decisive in bringing the conflicting parties together to negotiate the CFA, but 
also in designing the CFA itself—Solheim is largely credited for crafting the CFA.104 
Although Solheim’s reputation was sometimes placed under scrutiny by Sri 
Lankan officials for his alleged bias toward the LTTE, his knowledge of Sri Lanka, 
resilience, patience, and political mediation training he had had during his times as a 
politician were also often highlighted in both Sri Lanka and in Norway.105 Solheim’s 
mediation style was not only characterized by his crucial personal efforts in the pre-
negotiated period and in achieving the CFA, but also by his permanence as the key 
Norwegian mediator throughout the peace process—weathering political change in Sri 
Lanka and Norway, and his good reputation among the two conflicting parties and the 
two main political blocks in Sri Lanka. 
B. MEDIATION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
The analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will cover the mediated peace 
processes between Israel and the PLO, from the 1980s to the 2000 Camp David Summit 
(also known as Camp David II). In particular, the following four mediation cases are 
analyzed: U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz’s initiative, U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker’s efforts toward the Madrid Conference, Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan 
Jørgen Holst’s efforts toward the Oslo Accord, and U.S. President Bill Clinton’s efforts at 
the Wye River Summit and Camp David II. While there were more mediation efforts by 
other individuals, these did not produce significant agreements or progress in the process. 
Consequently, the selection of these four cases was based on the importance of the 
mediation conducted by those individuals, either by moving the process forward by 
creating opportunities and opening channels for negotiations, or ultimately helping the 
parties reach agreements.106 
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1. George Shultz 
The attention given to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during President Ronald 
Reagan’s administrations was largely a result of the personal interest of his Secretary of 
State, George Shultz, who served as such from July 1982 until the end of Reagan’s 
second term in January 1989. Scholar William B. Quandt notes that “during his initial 
confirmation hearings before the Senate in July, Shultz showed himself to be a careful, 
well-informed person, who seemed attentive to the nuances of the Middle East regional 
setting. He addressed the Palestinian issue in a forthright manner.”107 Shortly after his 
appointment, Shultz began working on a “fresh initiative” for the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which won Reagan’s support as soon as a month after he had been appointed.108 The 
American focus on the Palestinian side of the conflict came after the PLO left Lebanon 
following the 1982 Siege of Beirut; that context prompted Shultz to urge “the president to 
seize the moment to outline the new plan for a diplomatic settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.”109 In 1982, the American preference with respect to the conflict was 
to create “some form of association between the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan.”110 After 
failed attempts to bring Jordan and the PLO to work together, the link between the two 
parties was formalized—after three years of negotiations—in the Hussein-Arafat Accord 
on 11 February 1985.111 This agreement outlined, among other things, the creation of a 
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation and of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for an 
eventual international conference, intended to hold the peace talks.112 
Given the positive context, Shultz urged President Reagan to move forward with 
the idea of a US-Jordanian-Palestinian meeting to prepare the grounds for a peace 
process—focused on the Palestinian issue—between Israel and a joint Jordanian-
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Palestinian delegation. But the peace talk attempt soon faced developments that led to its 
failure. Although Israel disliked the idea of Americans talking to any Palestinians, 
Reagan only opposed American officials meeting with people associated with the PLO. 
Shultz could not soften Reagan on that issue and the vetting of Palestinian members of 
the delegation eventually led the idea of the meeting to fall apart. The relationship 
between Jordan’s King Hussein and Arafat began to crumble by October 1985, only 
months after they had reached their agreement, prompting Hussein to drop the Jordanian-
Palestinian coordination on 19 February 1986, days before the one-year anniversary of 
the agreement.113 
Seeking peace with Israel, King Hussein began reintroducing in 1986 the idea of 
an international conference.114 After Jordan and Israel received Shultz’s support, the  
Secretary of State went after Reagan’s approval for the idea and succeeded in his 
quest.115 The late 1987 intifada and the Israeli response placed worldwide attention on 
the regional conflict and thus strengthened the search for an agreement toward the 
international conference proposal.116 Consequently, Shultz began to “explore with all the 
parties, this time including Syria, the Soviets, and some individual Palestinians, as well as 
with Jordan and the Israelis.”117 Quandt notes that “the Palestinian issue, according to 
Shultz, should be addressed in negotiations between an Israeli delegation and a 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.”118 
Shultz quickly became the master architect of the peace attempt during the second 
half of the 1980s. His initiative “outlined the conventional goal of a comprehensive peace 
to be achieved through direct bilateral negotiations based on Resolutions 242 and 338” 
and contemplated that “the time scale envisioned in Camp David should be 
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compressed.”119 In addition, his plan specifically noted that the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict had to be dealt with through bilateral negotiations between the parties, but he 
also outlined a strong American involvement, which could be understood as mediation. 
Moreover, he also stressed the need for an international conference to take place before 
bilateral talks.120 
Shultz did not, however, have an easy task ahead of him. He tried to tackle Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s opposition to the initiative, Palestinian opposition to 
being relegated under Jordan, and the lack of Soviet enthusiasm regarding the conference. 
But upon reaching out to his key partner King Hussein, Shultz was left alone in the 
initiative after Jordan “relinquished all Jordanian legal and administrative ties to the West 
Bank, stating bluntly that henceforth the PLO would be responsible for the Palestinians 
living there.”121 
With the idea of an international conference left on stand-by, the United States 
now sought to establish a direct link with the PLO. In 1988, two paths paved the way 
toward an U.S.-PLO understanding: along one path, American Jewish leaders—together 
with the Swedish government—explored a contact with the PLO; along the other, another 
contact with the PLO was explored by Mohamed Rabie, a Palestinian American. 
Eventually, the Swedish mediated channel succeeded in connecting Shultz with Arafat: 
The result was that the PLO would agree to American terms for the beginning of the 
talks. The terms—which were elaborated by Shultz—included, among other things, the 
PLO’s condemnation and renouncement of terrorism. Arafat went ahead with the 
demands, but did not quite use the language proposed by Shultz. Consequently, Arafat 
had to reaffirm the PLO’s stance against terrorism and he explicitly renounced it. Shultz 
had succeeded not only in making the PLO take such importance step, but also in opening 
U.S.-PLO talks.122 
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Shultz’s plan for an international conference had not succeeded and the bilateral 
Israeli-Palestinian agenda did not really experience a major breakthrough, yet the United 
States had made a significant step to help future negotiations. With the opening of the 
U.S.-PLO channel, Shultz set a landmark precedent for future U.S. mediation in the 
conflict. 
2. James A. Baker III 
The new administration of President George H. W. Bush and his secretary of 
state, James A. Baker III, tried to build on the newly created U.S.-PLO channel, but 
because this communication did not include Arafat, they often relied on the good offices 
of the Swedish government and Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak to transmit high-level 
messages to the PLO’s leader. Soon after taking office, Baker established contact with 
Israeli Prime Minister Shamir with the intention of proceeding with the peace process; 
Baker also directed his efforts to putting together a long-awaited list of Palestinian 
negotiators. Nevertheless, the peace process suffered a setback in 1990 when violence 
erupted in the region and the PLO was accused of not holding up its renouncement of 
terrorism; consequently, in July that year, the U.S.-PLO channel was suspended. The 
peace process endured a more serious interruption still with the eruption of the Gulf War 
in 1991.123 
The postwar context was, however, favorable to the peace process. President Bush 
recognized the favorable historical context for the peace process at a joint session of 
Congress in March 1991.124 As Bush’s Secretary of State, Baker took up the peace 
mission and engaged in shuttle diplomacy throughout the Middle East. Quandt notes that 
“Baker began to resemble a former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, who had rushed to 
the region in the aftermath of another war, in 1973.”125 Baker recognized that “the 
strategic moment made the United States a credible neutral broker in the Middle East, 
and we looked for ways to take advantage of that reality. We also sought ways to use our 
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unique credibility in the region to exert leverage on each of the parties to pursue peace. 
Although there were in fact new realities that augured well for peace, no one in the 
Middle East wanted to blink first. So it was our job as mediator both to push and to pull 
the region toward peace.”126 Baker envisioned a two-track approach to the Middle East: 
Bilateral talks between Israel and Palestine, and the organization of a regional peace 
conference—co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union—that would bring 
together Israel and its Arab neighbors.127 Pursuing such vision, he went on a shuttle 
diplomacy, making eight trips to the Middle East from March to October 1991.128 
Baker’s trips included visits to Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, Mubarak, Shamir, 
delegations of Palestinians, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad, and King Hussein. Much of his 
diplomacy consisted in gaining support for the peace conference, which included 
overcoming Shamir’s strong objection to any PLO intromission, downplaying Assad’s 
demands concerning the framework of the conference, softening Shamir’s opposition to 
UN participation, and making the Palestinians drop their insistence of having 
representatives from East Jerusalem (something that would have killed the entire 
process). Baker also agreed to make some concessions: The United States pledged its 
support to repealing the “Zionism-is-racism” resolution at the United Nations, and letters 
of assurances were issued to Israel and then—after Arab demand—to Syria, Jordan, and 
the Palestinians. Even though the PLO did not officially attend the conference, the 
organization participated in the shadows by selecting the names of the Palestinian 
negotiators who formed the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.129 
The result of Baker’s shuttle diplomacy was significant: All concerned parties 
attended the Madrid Conference held from 30 October to 1 November 1991. Although 
the invitations to the conference were issued by both Baker and his Soviet counterpart 
Boris Pankin, and the conference was co-chaired jointly by the United States and the 
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Soviet Union, bringing all parties together was largely a U.S. triumph.130 Quandt notes 
that because of the unfolding events in the Soviet Union, especially the August 1991 
attempted coup against Gorbachev, “whatever slight chance there might have been for the 
Soviets to play an effective role as cochairman in the peace talks came to an end.”131 
Although the PLO presence at the conference was disguised, the Madrid 
Conference was a landmark in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. One of the key 
successes of the conference was that “for the first time in recent history, the Palestinians 
were present, speaking on their own behalf.”132 Following the Madrid Conference, “the 
parties would repeatedly be brought to the negotiating table—first in Washington in 
December 1991, then in January, in March, and again in April 1992, to be followed by 
more meetings in Rome.” Nevertheless, “despite appeals from the Arabs for more 
substantive American involvement, Bush and Baker held back.”133 Not surprisingly, the 
United States stuck to its mediating convention of wanting the parties to talk and reach 
agreements between each other, and not work on American formulas for each one of their 
conflicting issues.134  
In conclusion, U.S. mediation in the Middle East during George H. W. Bush’s 
administration was primarily a personal effort of Secretary of State James Baker. While 
Baker had been interested in achieving progress in the peace processes in the Middle East 
before the Gulf War crisis erupted, his motivation to achieve regional peace was 
potentiated with the window of opportunity that emerged after the war ended. In 
particular, he engaged in shuttle diplomacy at the highest levels throughout the Middle 
East, and developed a two-track approach to deal specifically with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Baker resurrected Shultz’s idea of an international conference and went to great 
lengths to bring about it: He not only planned the conference, but also exercised leverage, 
tackled obstacles, and granted concessions among the parties to bring them to the 
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negotiating table. The historic Palestinian representation in the Madrid Conference may 
be his greatest mediation success in the peace process. 
3. Johan Jørgen Holst 
Although an important step had been taken in Madrid by bringing Israelis and 
Palestinians together, the months following the conference did not look promising. 
Contrary to what Israel had hoped, the Palestinian delegates could not stand for 
themselves as independent negotiators, since they were under the PLO’s oversight. 
Scholars note that “at that point, many people began to feel that the conflict could only be 
resolved through direct talks between Israel and the PLO . . . but this was difficult 
because Israel did not recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian 
people.”135 In effect, further progress in the peace process seemed to inevitably include 
the official participation of the PLO—and this would soon be achieved through 
Norwegian mediation. 
In 1992, Norway took advantage of its close relations with Israel and Arafat and 
explored a channel for negotiations. With the approval of Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jan Egeland, went ahead 
with the idea, along with his assistant Mona Juul, and Terje Rød Larsen, the director of 
the Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO). They contacted the Israeli Foreign 
Affairs Deputy Minister Yossi Beilin, who welcomed the idea to establish the channel 
and pointed them toward two Israeli academics from an NGO called “Economic 
Cooperation Foundation:” Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak. On the side of the PLO, a 
contact was established with the PLO’s Economy Minister Abu Alá, and two other high-
ranking PLO officials, Hassan Asfour and Maher el-Kurd.136 
The PLO officials and the Israeli academics, together with Norwegian facilitators, 
convened on 20–22 January 1993 in Sarpsborg, near Oslo, Norway, under the false 
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pretense of a FAFO seminar.137 The Norwegian team, composed by Egeland, Juul, and 
Larsen, facilitated the talks and assisted with the logistics of the meetings, all under strict 
secrecy. By the third meeting, a draft declaration of principles had emerged between the 
two parties; more progress was made in the following two meetings. While the PLO side 
counted as official representation, Israel was still being represented by the academics. 
Consequently, after verifying the seriousness of the meetings, Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin and his Foreign Minister Shimon Peres assigned the Director General of 
the Foreign Ministry Uri Savir to be the official Israeli representative to the talks,138 
making it the first ever official encounter between Israel and the PLO.139 
The talks, which had been promising in their first nine rounds, broke down in 
July, and the Norwegians had to intercede. New positions and disagreements over the 
drafts prompted Egeland, Larsen, and Juul to try to bring the parties to common ground. 
With the negotiations stalled, Johan Jørgen Holst—who had succeeded Stoltenberg in 
April as the head of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry—began to take a more personal 
approach in the facilitation. Holst, together with Juul and Larsen, held meetings with 
Arafat in July. Days later, Juul and Larsen also met with Rabin to guarantee the 
continuity of the talks, a goal they achieved.140  
With Rabin and Arafat still on board, the negotiations began to scale-up on key 
points. As Egeland notes, “as in other tough negotiations the final points of contention 
were lifted to the highest levels.”141 The Norwegian team had set themselves a target for 
reaching an agreement by Peres’ visit to Scandinavia in mid-August. As Egeland recalls:  
In the early morning of August 17, Peres called Foreign Minister Holst, 
who was visiting in Iceland: “Can you meet me discreetly in Stockholm 
tonight? It is now or never.” That night Holst sat for eight hours with a 
phone at the Swedish Haga Castle and transmitted messages from Peres 
next door to Arafat, who sat in his office in Tunis. At 5:00 a.m. the final 
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wording on security for Israeli settlers and on the location and authority of 
the future Palestinian Council were agreed on. The negotiators embraced 
in Tunis as well as at the Swedish castle.142 
By holding that “delicate three-way conversation,” as scholars put it, “Holst was 
the consummate conduit, informed, courteous, patient, and totally non-interfering.”143 
Pruitt, Bercovitch, and Zartman highlight that, “like any self-effacing mediator, Holst’s 
last words to Arafat were: ‘You did it. Congratulations.’”144 The document was initialed 
by the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on 20 August. The memorable ceremony, 
however, took place when Rabin and Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements (or simply known as the Declaration of 
Principles—DOP—or Oslo Accord) and shook hands on 13 September 1993 in the White 
House.145 
Notably, the road to the Oslo Accord made its way through what is referred to as 
track II diplomacy (in this case, through unofficial and informal channels, such as with 
the presence of academics), but it was governmental mediation that assured the success of 
the process.146 While for the most part the Norwegian facilitation between the conflicting 
parties was conducted by a team (Egeland, Juul, and Larsen), it was the personal effort of 
Foreign Minister Holst that succeeded in bringing the parties to the agreement. 
Notwithstanding the roles of Soltenberg, Egeland, and Juul, Aggestam argues that “it was 
the sociologist Larsen and the new Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst—each in their own 
capacity as an informal and formal mediator—who in a decisive way influenced the 
negotiation process.”147 Aggestam continues: “When the secret channel turned from a 
back to a front channel and with the prospect to conclude a DOP, Holst augmented his 
role as a mediator.” With regard to Larsen, Aggestam says that he “played a significant 
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role in improving communication and facilitating a supportive negotiation milieu.”148 
While Aggestam’s work focuses in highlighting both Larsen and Holst as individual 
mediators, Holst’s role appears more relevant to the focus of this thesis, given his 
leadership in helping Arafat and Peres reach the agreement. 
In short, while the role of the Norwegian mediating team was crucial in handling 
the logistics and secrecy of the talks, the groundbreaking mediation that eventually 
resulted in signing of the Oslo Accord was primarily a result of Holst’s personal skills. 
Shortly after his appointment, the Norwegian Foreign Minister helped the parties to 
overcome their stalemate. Once the talks were back on track, the key negotiated points 
quickly scaled up the command chain and involved the two conflicting parties’ leaders; 
consequently, Holst’s rank as a Foreign Minister stood him up to the demanding 
circumstances and positioned him as a high-level mediator. In effect, by asking Holst to 
be the communicator between the two parties, Peres trusted him with the crucial and final 
phase of the talks. Holst’s personal approach—based on his reputation and skills—was 
thus essential in reaching the agreement. 
4. Bill Clinton 
As it has been noted, the months following the 1991 Madrid Conference did not 
witness signs of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. With President Bill 
Clinton in office by 1993, Washington started focusing on the enhanced role that the 
United States could play to facilitate further progress between the parties. Nevertheless, 
the American channel was placed on stand-by because of the ongoing and secret 
Norwegian channel that eventually led to the signing of the Oslo Accord.149 With 
President Clinton arranging the DOP signing ceremony in the White House, the United 
States delivered the message that it “would be ready and willing to lend its help for 
further steps on the way to Arab-Israeli peace.”150 
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Though not groundbreaking, some progress was made in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process during Clinton’s first term. Talks with Syria and Jordan had some positive 
results, and the Palestinian front brought three more documents: the Cairo Agreement, the 
Oslo II Accord, and the Hebron agreement. The first document, which was crafted with 
limited American involvement, dealt with some implementation details of the original 
Oslo Accord. The Oslo II Accord—signed on 28 September 1995 in Washington with the 
presence of Clinton, Mubarak, and Hussein—dealt primarily with geographic 
dispositions in the conflicting zone and institutional aspects of the newly created 
Palestinian Authority. The Hebron agreement, which was signed in the last days of 
Clinton’s first term in 1997 between the new Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
and Arafat, was crafted with more American involvement and dealt with Israel 
withdrawals in that city, in accordance with Oslo II.151 
While “nothing happened in Clinton’s first term comparable to the Kissinger 
shuttles, Camp David, or Baker’s organization of the Madrid conference,” two 
developments that took place during Clinton’s second term stand out as landmark 
moments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process: the Wye River Summit and Camp 
David II.152 The strategy that led to the Wye talks was constructed by Clinton with the 
assistance of his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. By September 1998, “Albright 
and Clinton began to turn up the heat on Netanyahu and Arafat to break the nearly two-
year-old negotiating deadlock.”153 The idea was that the PLO would enhance its security 
efforts, reaffirm its respect toward Israel, and Israel would make further territory 
withdrawals.154 In October 1998, Clinton invited Arafat and Netanyahu for a summit at 
the Wye River plantation in Maryland. Netanyahu was assisted by his Foreign Minister 
Ariel Sharon, and Clinton relied on Secretary Albright and advisors Sandy Berger and 
Dennis Ross.155 During the summit, Clinton broke a seven-day stalemate between the 
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two parties: On the night of 22 October, his efforts helped Arafat and Netanyahu reach an 
agreement the following day, 23 October.156 In the Wye River Memorandum, 
“Palestinians committed themselves to further steps on security and revocation of parts of 
the National Charter; Israel undertook to make a series of gradual withdrawals as 
Palestinians carried out their side of the bargain. Israel also promised to release a number 
of prisoners.”157 
The goal after Wye River was to create a final-status solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, but a few developments occurred in the interim between Wye River 
and the next substantial attempt at Camp David II. The talks were not followed-up by 
actions and the agreement was soon stalled. With the Lewinsky scandal and impeachment 
process unfolding in United States, Clinton was not the only one facing turbulent political 
times. Netanyahu was losing political support in Israel and in the May 1999 elections he 
was succeeded by Ehud Barak. The new Israeli Prime Minister quickly sought to build up 
his relations with Clinton and supported American sponsorship of the peace process. On 
the U.S. side, Clinton’s presidency was soon coming to an end; if the peace process was 
to move forward, it had to be accelerated.158 
Clinton was eager to make progress in the peace process. As Quandt notes, “over 
the years, Clinton had reportedly gained self-confidence in his ability to deal with 
international issues, and he had become particularly intent on trying to achieve a 
breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli arena.”159 Some efforts were still carried out in the 
Israeli-Syrian negotiations, but the attention would once again shift to the Palestinian 
front, especially after Arafat and Barak set 13 September 2000 as the deadline to craft a 
final solution to their conflict.160 After a failed Swedish channel of negotiations in June 
2000, Barak proposed to Clinton the idea of a new American-sponsored summit; shortly 
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thereafter, Clinton met with Arafat to discuss the idea and convinced the Palestinian 
leader to participate. 
Being aware of the positive image that the conflicting parties had of him, Clinton 
used the last months in his presidency to facilitate a final agreement for the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. The most notorious attempt was made at Camp David, where 
Arafat and Barak convened on 11 July 2000. At Camp David II, as it was called, Arafat 
and Barak discussed territorial divisions, further Israeli withdrawals, the status of East 
Jerusalem, the establishment of the Palestinian state, and sovereignty over certain 
neighborhoods and the holy site at Temple Mount/Haram-al-Sharif, among other issues. 
Both Arafat and Barak accused each other of failing to make concessions, and Clinton 
found himself meeting with each party, transmitting the other’s position and trying to find 
common ground. A sovereignty disagreement over certain neighborhoods in Jerusalem 
and the holy site marked the end of the summit, without an agreement.161 
While Camp David II failed to reach an agreement, Clinton still tried to facilitate 
an agreement in the remaining months of his presidency. Not only did the parties fail to 
compromise, but now the region was facing violence as a new intifada unfolded in 
September-October 2000. Clinton urged the parties to end the violence and on 16 October 
he managed to bring the parties together again at a summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt. 
The next day, Clinton announced that the parties were willing to end the violence and 
investigate its causes. Clinton’s last peace effort took place at the White House in 
December 2000, where he proposed to the Israelis and Palestinians an American solution 
to the conflict which dealt with the issues that had caused controversy at Camp David II. 
While Barak’s support was more forthcoming for the American proposal, Arafat placed 
several objections to the plan and Clinton’s last peace attempt failed.162 
In sum, Clinton adopted a prominent personal approach during his mediation in 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. By hosting the signing ceremony of the Oslo 
Accord in the White House, Clinton made it clear that he aspired to mediate between 
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Israel and the PLO. His approach consisted in breaking deadlocks and generating 
momentum to reach a final peace agreement between the parties. First, he persuaded 
Arafat and Netanyahu to meet at Wye River; during this summit, he succeeded in 
breaking a deadlock and helped them reach the Wye River Memorandum. When Barak 
succeeded Netanyahu, the new Israeli Prime Minister asked Clinton to mediate in the 
peace process. Clinton was not only eager to achieve peace in the region, but was also 
reputable among both conflicting parties. Consequently, he recognized the urgency of the 
historic opportunity and gathered both leaders at Camp David II; although he was an 
active mediator, this meeting did not end with an agreement. In the remaining months of 
his presidency, the U.S. president was still committed to make progress in the peace 
process; however, he soon ran out of time to convince Arafat to soften his position on key 
issues. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Erik Solheim’s mediation case contributes to the construction of the personalistic 
style of mediation in various ways. His designation as a mediator was probably founded 
on his knowledge of Sri Lanka and his political negotiation experience. Solheim 
remained the key Norwegian facilitator throughout the process. Initially, he was the sole 
mediator. Afterward, when Vidar Helgesen was officially in charge of the mediation, 
Solheim still was the person in charge of the daily running of the mediation. Even when 
he was appointed as Minister of International Development and Jon Hanssen-Bauer took 
his place as Special Envoy, Solheim still remained in charge of the process and made 
frequent visits to Sri Lanka. 
President Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, was perhaps the 
most influential of the foreign ministers analyzed in this chapter. U.S. mediation in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was largely Shultz’s personal effort. He was the mastermind of the 
U.S. mediation plan for the Middle East, sought and received Reagan’s support, and 
personally dealt with the region’s leaders. He envisioned a peace conference, but soon 
realized that some of the region’s leaders were not ready for such commitment. 
 39 
Nevertheless, Shultz’s leverage succeeded in making the PLO renounce terrorism. In 
addition, he can also be credited for having opened the U.S.-PLO channel. 
After the Gulf War ended, James Baker set himself to organize the long-awaited 
Arab-Israeli peace conference. Baker made Shultz’s idea his own, and engaged in shuttle 
diplomacy throughout the region seeking support. Like Shultz, Baker also exercised 
strong leverage with the parties. After tackling obstacles and granting concessions, he 
gathered the support needed to organize the conference and contributed in setting the 
landmark precedent of Palestinian representation in the peace process.  
Johan Jørgen Holst’s efforts were crucial in reaching the Oslo Accord during the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks facilitated by Norway. The conflicting parties’ leaders 
relied on Holst to break a deadlock and sort out the final arrangements of the negotiation. 
Holst stood up to the demanding circumstances: He was a reputable high-ranking 
politician and had great communication skills. 
President Clinton was deeply involved with the Israeli-Palestinian peace cause. 
He personally reached to the Israeli and PLO leaders seeking to make progress in the 
process. With his reputation and leverage, Clinton managed to break deadlocks and 
achieve some agreements between the parties; he even proposed a peace plan of his own. 
Neither the failure to reach an agreement at Camp David II nor the limited amount of 
time that he had left in office prevented Clinton from using every opportunity to persuade 
the parties to make concessions and reach a final peace agreement.   
In three of the cases analyzed (Shultz, Baker, and Holst), the mediation was 
conducted by foreign ministers. Two of them (Shultz and Baker) relied heavily on shuttle 
diplomacy. Another case (Solheim) involved a high-ranking politician. The mediation in 
the remaining case (Clinton) was conducted by a president. All of these cases help 
construct the concept of the personalistic style of mediation. The analysis shows that 
personalistic mediation derives from various characteristics, and that it is unlikely for all 
these characteristics to be present at the same time in a given mediation case. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZED MEDIATION 
While categorization that recognizes states, organizations, and individuals as the 
three providers of mediation is generally useful because it differentiates among actors, 
styles of mediation do not always match the specific characteristics of the providers. 
Unlike personalistic mediation, which is usually associated with individual actors, 
institutionalized mediation is not limited to the presence of a specific provider. 
Institutionalized mediation does not refer to the mediation exercised by preexisting 
institutions or organizations, but rather to the style of mediation that emerges from the 
creation of ad hoc institutions in peace processes. These institutions can theoretically be 
linked to any of the three providers of mediation. While states, organizations, and 
individuals may take part of the institution created to mediate, the mediation in the peace 
process will be exercised under an institutional umbrella and on behalf of the institution 
itself, and not by the individual parties that are integrated into it.  
This chapter analyzes the mediating institutions created in the Sri Lankan and 
Northern Ireland conflicts. First, the mediation role of the Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chairs is 
analyzed. Subsequently, mediation in Northern Ireland is studied by analyzing the 
International Body and the Office of the Independent Chairmen.   
In sum, this chapter will study the institutionalized style of mediation, which may 
be found whenever the mandate of an institution created during a peace process leaves 
room for a mediation strategy. The Sri Lankan and Northern Ireland conflicts will be 
used to analyze this style of mediation. 
A. MEDIATION IN THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT 
While Norwegian mediation—conducted most notably by Erik Solheim—was the 
most important form of conflict management in Sri Lanka, other third parties also 
exercised mediation, though to a lesser extent. This involvement came in the form of the 
Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chairs, an institution which emerged in the Tokyo Conference on 
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Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka in June 2003 and was composed of the 
United States, the European Union (EU), Japan, and Norway.163  
Some 51 countries and 22 international organizations convened at the Tokyo 
Conference and made a pledge of “foreign aid of approximately US$4.5 billion over the 
four-year period 2003–06 and closely linked this to the progress of the peace talks.”164 
The Tokyo Conference aimed to “provide the international community with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its strong and unified commitment to the reconstruction and 
development of Sri Lanka and to encourage the parties to redouble their efforts to make 
further progress in the peace process.”165 The Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chairs met 
“periodically to coordinate efforts to fulfill its responsibility under the Tokyo Declaration 
of 2003 to monitor reconstruction assistance to Sri Lanka and the peace process.”166 
The co-chairs institution was not meant to be an additional mediator in the 
process, but rather to manage the foreign aid pledged by the donors and support the peace 
process. Nevertheless, there is evidence that—from the beginning—Norway sought in the 
co-chairs additional international leverage in the conflict, and that the co-chairs began 
acting accordingly. A report commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation’s Evaluation Department, referred to as the “Norad report,” notes that 
“particularly after the peace talks unraveled the Norwegians struggled to preserve a level 
of international attention.”167 Norway’s strategy succeeded: The Donor Group and 
especially the Co-Chairs decreased Norway’s “exposure as a solitary mediator,” and at 
the same time provided Norway with additional leverage, given that Norway was also a 
co-chair.168  
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Adam Burke and Anthea Mulakala note that the co-chairs “provided not only 
economic guarantees (the promise of a peace dividend), but also political ones. They 
underwrote the peace process, not just through their influence over aid, but also by 
lending their political weight to the process.”169 Although Chanaka Talpahewa 
recognizes that the co-chairs were “not involved in the peace process directly,” he notes 
that they “performed a supervisory role.”170 
The co-chairs arrangement was, however, flawed from its start. While the 
government of Sri Lanka participated in the Tokyo Conference, the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam chose not to participate in the Conference as a sign of opposition to various 
Sri Lankan government stances at that time.171 In addition, another institutional flaw was 
that some of the co-chairs had proscribed the LTTE: For example, the United States in 
1997, the United Kingdom (member of the EU co-chair) in 2001, and later the EU as a 
whole in 2006.172 Moreover, according to Maria Groeneveld-Savisaar and Siniša 
Vuković, “positive incentives did not succeed in getting the parties back to the 
negotiating table. Neither Sri Lanka nor the LTTE was aid dependent.”173 The co-chairs’ 
approach to the peace process took the form of a limited mediation role: The funds were 
regarded as the carrots, whereas the sticks were materialized in the condemning 
statements that they issued.174 
The co-chairs issued several statements from 2003 to 2009 directed to the 
government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. Some of the statements were intended to draw 
the parties’ attention to the “civilian suffering and the need to resume a political 
track.”175 The Norad report also notes that the co-chairs became increasingly hard on the 
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LTTE with time; following the European Union’s proscription of the LTTE in May 2006, 
Norway was “the only of the four co-chairs (Norway, EU, U.S., and Japan) still willing to 
meet with the LTTE. Though the co-chairs continue to release critical statements toward 
both parties condemning the violence an urging them to resume negotiations,” some of 
the co-chairs were particularly reluctant to criticize the government.176 
Although the mediation literature shows that mediator’s neutrality is not an 
excluding factor for conducting mediation, the LTTE proscription by some of the co-
chairs certainly does not match up to the mediation theory; in addition, further theoretical 
conflict may be found in the LTTE decision to exclude itself from the Tokyo Conference 
in 2003. Nevertheless, the close linkage between the peace process (which the LTTE 
officially recognized) and the foreign aid support network (which included the work of 
the co-chairs) may suggest an implicit LTTE recognition of the role of co-chairs in the 
peace process. Such recognition did not mean, however, that the LTTE adjusted its 
activities to the demands of the co-chairs. For instance, when seeking a limited cease-fire 
in February 2009, the co-chairs urged the LTTE to “lay down [their] arms” and suggested 
that both parties “declare a temporary cease-fire and resume dialogue;” however, the 
LTTE ignored their request.177 Scholars note that “as the parties to the conflict became 
aware of the mediators’ limited interests and restrained use of sticks, the mediating 
parties’ leverage was also limited.”178 
However limited the co-chairs’ leverage may have been, institutional unity 
usually prevailed over the single members’ interests. With regard to institutional 
cohesion, “relations between co-chairs were considered good: They were mainly 
speaking with one voice by issuing common statements, with no significant spoilers 
among them. The co-chair mechanism provided a broad base as well as a division of 
labor.”179 
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In sum, the United States, the EU, Japan, and Norway exercised limited mediation 
in the Sri Lankan peace process under the institutional umbrella of the co-chairs 
arrangement. The co-chairs arrangement was not primarily designed as a complement to 
Norway’s official mediation, but rather as a managerial institution of the donor group; 
nevertheless, its mandate did seem to pave the way for some kind of limited mediation. 
Indeed, the Tokyo Declaration mandated the co-chairs to “encourage the parties to 
redouble their efforts to make further progress in the peace process.”180 Such 
involvement can be understood in the form of the sticks and carrots that the co-chairs had 
at their disposal. Since the sticks (statements) usually lacked strength, the carrots (foreign 
aid) seem to have had a bigger impact on the process. As the mediation literature 
suggests, the co-chairs can be said to have used a compensation strategy to enhance the 
“attractiveness of some alternatives” (in this case, peace talks over war), in a non-
directive way intended to produce “a favorable climate for mediation.”181  
B. MEDIATION IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT 
The mediation in the Northern Ireland peace process that culminated in the 
Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) was twofold. First, an 
International Body was in charge of testing the waters for negotiations and setting the 
table for the talks. Secondly, once the parties had agreed on the format of the talks, the 
Office of the Independent Chairmen continued with the mediation until the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) was reached. Both mediation cases are analyzed in the two following 
sections. 
1. The International Body 
The British and Irish heads of government, Prime Minister John Major and the 
Taoiseach, John Bruton, decided to establish an International Body (IB) in November 
1995 to pave the way for a peace process in Northern Ireland. Its mandate was to “report 
on the willingness of the parties to engage in decommissioning, and to suggest how that 
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could be accomplished.”182 The IB was composed of three men who had until recently 
been working in high-ranking posts: former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, former 
Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, and former Canadian Chief of Defense Staff John 
de Chastelain.183  
Arms decommissioning was central to the peace process; some parties to the 
conflict wanted prior decommissioning, while others wanted to first hold the talks and 
then proceed to decommission the weapons of the paramilitary groups. The IB’s mandate 
to mediate was thus implicit: Created to test the waters for decommissioning and also to 
advise on how to proceed on those grounds, the IB would jump-start the peace process by 
facilitating and formulating plans among the parties. 
The IB began functioning in December 1995, when Mitchell—who became its 
chief of staff—convened with the rest of the team to envision the institution’s approach. 
Since Mitchell had previously worked with President Bill Clinton on the economic 
development of Northern Ireland, he was the IB’s member with the most experience in 
the region.184 Consequently, Mitchell was aware that lack of trust was a problematic 
issue between the parties. The institution thus set itself to build trust in the process and to 
“get the views of as many as possible in Northern Ireland, London, and Dublin.”185 
Therefore, the IB held meetings throughout December 1995 and January 1996 with 
Major, Bruton, British Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew, Irish Foreign Minister 
Dick Spring, several political parties in Northern Ireland, representatives from the 
security forces, non-governmental organizations, and religious leaders.186 
The IB released its report on arms decommissioning on 22 January 1996. 
Following its mandate, the institution assessed the issue of decommissioning and 
concluded that there was a “commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms 
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to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the 
process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning 
prior to such negotiations.”187 The British wanted prior decommissioning, but the Irish 
government feared that decommissioning as a precondition would trump the peace 
process.188 As Mitchell recalls, “the unionist nightmare was that they would be forced to 
enter talks with Sinn Féin while a heavily armed IRA waited outside the door; at the first 
sign that Sinn Féin wasn’t getting what it wanted in the talks the campaign of violence 
would resume.”189  
Since the time at which the decommissioning would take place was a crucial 
aspect of the process, the IB had to make a compromise between the parties. 
Consequently, the need to “help the democratic process move forward . . . [and] create 
the climate in which decommissioning could occur” prompted the institution to suggest in 
its report six principles of democracy and nonviolence (sometimes referred to as “The 
Mitchell Principles”) “to which any party wanting to enter negotiations would have to 
commit itself.”190 
Moreover, the IB also followed its mandate of identifying and advising “on a 
suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning.”191 
Accordingly, the members proposed four methods: “The transfer of armaments; the 
provision of information leading to their discovery; the depositing of armaments for 
collection; or their destruction by the paramilitary groups themselves.”192 In addition, 
they also suggested a set of guarantees for the process which, among other things, 
included the work of an independent commission.193 
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Although the IB was only mandated to make recommendations on 
decommissioning, its members were still regarded as important for delivering other 
recommendations on “the general need for confidence-building measures.”194 As 
summarized by de Chastelain: 
Items in this section included the need to review paramilitary activities 
such as surveillance and targeting; the provision of information on the 
missing and the exiled; action on prisoners and on emergency legislation; 
the need to review the holding of legally held arms ‘as the threat reduces’; 
more balanced representation in the police force; the need for increased 
emphasis on economic and social development; and the utility of an 
elected body to enhance the process of building confidence.195 
Not only did Mitchell, Holkeri, and de Chastelain successfully put together a 
report that addressed the IB’s mandate, but they also included recommendations—such as 
the Mitchell Principles—that would provide an essential framework for the peace process 
that was soon going to unravel. Even though each one of the members had an assistant 
from the foreign ministries of their respective countries, the IB’s work was characterized 
by its neutrality in the process and institutional unity.196 In effect, one of the paragraphs 
of the IB’s report reflects on the role that the joint communiqué gave to it in the process:  
We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland 
other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of 
its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective 
to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment 
represents our best and our independent judgment. We are unanimous in 
our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.197 
Such emphasis on the institution’s neutrality and unanimity serves to visualize the 
importance of institutionalized mediation in the Northern Ireland peace process. Even 
though the press and some academics assign Mitchell with most of the credit for the 
success in the peace process, the other two members were also as important. Perhaps 
recognition of Mitchell’s contributions is heightened by his soon-to-follow role as the 
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head of the Office of the Independent Chairmen during the actual negotiations, but 
Mitchell himself is always keen to recognize the IB’s work as a team effort: “We never 
had a serious disagreement, substantive or personal. My two colleagues and their staffs 
were a pleasure to work with: Fair, open-minded, willing to work hard. De Chastelain 
and Holkeri deserve a lot more credit than they have received for their efforts.”198 
Similarly, de Chastelain recognizes that a “cooperative spirit” characterized the IB’s 
work.199 
With the release of its report, the IB culminated its mandate and the institution 
was disbanded.200 Although the IB was not specifically designed to mediate in the peace 
process, its mandate implied adopting a strategy of searching for common ground on 
some key aspects such as decommissioning, and also producing a favorable climate for 
future negotiations with the suggested principles of democracy and nonviolence.201 Such 
mediation strategies paved the way for the all-party negotiations. 
2. The Office of the Independent Chairmen 
The ideas that the International Body put forward in its report were helping the 
process move forward. Representation in the all-party peace talks would be drawn from 
an elected ad hoc forum: Elections to the forum were held on 30 May under a system 
which guaranteed vast representation of both communities in Northern Ireland. Not only 
would the main parties be represented, but also those that had links to the paramilitary 
organizations of both sides. In total, ten parties were granted delegates. On the Unionist 
side, the Ulster Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party were the largest parties, 
but were joined by smaller ones like the United Kingdom Unionist Party, the Progressive 
Unionist Party, and the Ulster Democratic Party. On the republican side, the largest party 
was the Social Democratic and Labour Party, followed by Sinn Féin. Other non-sectarian 
parties included the Alliance, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, and the Labour 
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Party. While the elections were meant to form a Forum which would then appoint the 
delegates to the talks, Sinn Féin never attended the meetings and the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party withdrew in July—the Forum soon lost its spotlight to the actual 
plenary sessions of the talks.202 
The Ground Rules for Substantive All-Party Negotiations, which was one of the 
first documents of the peace process, arranged the negotiations in three strands: The first 
one dealt with political arrangements within Northern Ireland; the second dealt with 
north-south relations; and the third one dealt with the relations between Britain and 
Ireland.203 The document, which was elaborated by the British and Irish governments—
in consultation with the parties—also incorporated the notion of a chairmanship of the 
process, thus setting the stage for further international mediation in the peace process.204  
Additional documents, such as the Scenario for the Opening Session, Procedural 
Guidelines for the Conduct of Substantive All-Party Negotiations, and Draft Agenda for 
Substantive All-Party Negotiations were written to provide the basis of the peace 
process.205 In addition to the Plenary Committee, the peace process also envisioned a 
Business Committee (in charge of procedural issues) and a subcommittee on 
decommissioning.206 As John de Chastelain recalls, “the Scenario document invited the 
three members of the International Body, George Mitchell, Harri Holkeri, and me, to 
chair those aspects of the negotiations that required independent chairmen (the Plenary 
Committee, Strand Two, the Business Committee, and the decommissioning 
subcommittee). Senator Mitchell would chair the Plenary Committee and the other 
positions would be approved as the negotiations proceeded.”207 
The Office of the Independent Chairmen began functioning on 8 June 1996 and 
the talks were set to start on 10 June. The participants of the talks (which were drawn in 
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following the results of the Forum election) were reluctant to accept the peace process 
documents agreed upon by the governments—especially the unionist factions.208 Instead 
of holding a Plenary Committee session in accordance to those documents, the 
participants decided to hold “an informal session [that] would convene under the interim 
chairmanship of Mitchell and his colleagues, and would continue in that format until 
Rules of Procedure, the final decision on the chairmanship, and an agenda for the 
remainder of the Opening Plenary had been agreed upon by the participants.”209 Again, 
the work of the former International Body proved essential: During the informal session, 
“Mitchell took the chair and accepted, individually, the formal adoption of the six 
principles by the two governments and the seven remaining parties.”210 Sinn Féin, widely 
regarded as the political wing of the paramilitary group, the Irish Republican Army, had 
been excluded of the talks due to IRA violence.211 
Informal sessions thus began on 10 June 1996 and paved the way toward the 
formal Plenary Committee sessions. During the informal sessions, the parties approved 
an elaborate rule of sufficient consensus for decision-making, the chairmanship, and the 
Business Committee. The formal Plenary Committee sessions commenced in September, 
when the Rules of Procedure were adopted; the agenda for the opening plenary was 
agreed upon by mid-October. Although the talks began on 10 June 1996, the first fifteen 
months were spent debating proceedings—substantive negotiations started in October 
1997.212 Despite the fact that the loyalist ceasefire had been maintained, the IRA 
conducted several attacks during the peace process.213 Sinn Féin was not allowed to 
participate in the talks until the IRA declared a new ceasefire on 20 July 1997, after 
encouragement from the British and Irish governments.214  
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Decommissioning was a central issue during the talks. By December 1996, the 
parties “agreed that during the [holiday] break the participants would review their 
proposals on decommissioning . . . to see if they could identify areas of potential 
compromise. The chairmen would likewise review the parties’ papers to see if they could 
find areas of convergence.”215 The talks resumed in mid-January and the debate was at 
times framed under bilateral or plenary sessions. By mid-February 1997, the chairmen 
adopted a more active mediating role, seeking common ground on decommissioning.216 
Although the International Body had a fixed time mandate of two months, there 
was no deadline for the peace process itself. Moving the stalled process forward would 
become a priority for the new British and Irish heads of government that emerged in the 
1997 elections: Tony Blair succeeded John Major in London, and Bertie Ahern 
succeeded John Bruton in Dublin.217 The Plenary Committee reconvened in June: 
In August, the two governments completed an agreement establishing an 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, which 
would come into operation when the talks move into the substantive 
negotiations phase. The governments also announced that this body would 
maintain the representation from Canada, Finland, and the United 
States.218  
Sinn Féin was allowed into the talks by September, following the IRA ceasefire 
declaration in July.219 In addition, “a Liaison Subcommittee on Decommissioning made 
up of the participants would be established, to which the commission would report.”220  
The role of international mediation became clearer in September, when the 
Plenary Committee adopted the Procedural Motion. As de Chastelain recalls: 
The Procedural Motion established George Mitchell, Harri Holkeri, and 
me as cochairmen of the Strand Two negotiations, and me as chairman of 
the decommissioning body. Mitchell would continue to chair the Plenary 
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Committee and the Strand Two negotiations. Harri Holkeri would 
continue to be the alternate chair for both, and would chair the liaison 
subcommittees. I would continue as chairman of the Business Committee 
and assist Holkeri with Strand Two meetings when Mitchell was 
unavailable.221 
The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (hereinafter 
abbreviated as “the commission”) was mandated to consult widely and recommend on 
methods for decommissioning, to facilitate the actual decommissioning, and to report to 
both governments. The commission was formed by de Chastelain, Finnish retired 
Brigadier Tauno Nieminen, and U.S. Ambassador Donald Johnson—all three supported 
by an assistant from their respective countries.222 
Substantive negotiations on Strand One and Strand Two started in late September 
1997, but most common ground was found in March 1998 in the weeks before the Easter 
deadline that had been set for the process. Strand Three was negotiated through bilateral 
governmental talks between Ireland and Britain. Meanwhile, the work of the commission 
was also fruitful because the Liaison Sub-Committee on Decommissioning approved the 
two decommissioning methods that the commission had suggested.223 Crucial mediation 
was exercised by the chairmen in the two weeks left before the deadline: “The chairmen 
would draw together the parties’ proposals on Strand One and Strand Two, and, together 
with the governments’ paper on Strand Three and a paper on confidence-building 
measures, produce an outline draft Agreement for circulation and debate.”224 The 
chairmen’s role was essential in ironing out the parties’ differences, producing and 
circulating drafts for debate, and convincing reluctant party leaders to embrace the 
agreements. On 10 April 1998, the Plenary Committee approved the final agreement that 
would be referred to as the Belfast Agreement or Good Friday Agreement. As 
summarized by Jonathan Tonge, the GFA “created devolved government in Northern 
Ireland, on the basis of power sharing between representatives of the unionist and 
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nationalist communities. The agreement established a cross-community ruling executive, 
a 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly, cross-border bodies, and a British-Irish 
council.”225 
After the negotiating parties reached the GFA, the agreement was 
“overwhelmingly endorsed 12 days later by popular referenda in both Northern Ireland 
(71 percent support) and the Republic of Ireland (94 percent).”226 Consequently, the 
Office of the Independent Chairmen had completed its work and it disbanded.227 
Although the GFA did not come with an immediate end of sectarian violence, “the 
change was . . . more a matter of type and degree, with a diffusion of violence 
accompanied by clear evidence of popular support for the cease-fire through elections to 
the Northern Ireland Assembly.”228 As Audrey K. Cronin argued as of 2009, “while it 
could not be said that peace had come fully to Northern Ireland—and weapons 
decommissioning, policing, and prisoner releases remained sources of tension—there was 
a sense that the political process had replaced terrorist attacks as the focal point of 
popular attention and as the primary vehicle of change.”229 The IRA announced the end 
of its armed campaign in 2005; in 2011, the decommissioning commission finalized its 
work with a final report noting that most of the armed groups in Northern Ireland had 
decommissioned their arms.230 
While the intractable and deeply-rooted political conflict in Northern Ireland still 
faces challenges, the peace process—as Cronin notes—succeeded in bringing an end to 
the violence in the region. International involvement was present in all stages of the 
process: at the beginning, with the mediation and technical assistance of the International 
Body; during the talks, with the work of the independent chairmen; and after the GFA 
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was reached, with the work of the commission dealing with the complex issue of arms 
decommissioning. Much of the success of the peace process was reached thanks to the 
work of institutionalized mediation carried out by the International Body and the Office 
of the Independent Chairmen. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Although the institution known as the Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chairs—composed of 
the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Norway—was not primarily designed 
to mediate in the conflict, it still exercised limited mediation between the government of 
Sri Lanka and the LTTE, which took the form of carrots (foreign aid) and sticks 
(condemning statements). The mediation exercised by the co-chairs was characterized by 
the institutional unity of its members, who often spoke with one voice and also divided 
the work among them. The co-chairs’ mediation approach took the form of a 
compensation strategy, by enhancing the attractiveness of talks over war and also by 
producing a favorable climate for the mediation. 
The International Body in Northern Ireland, composed of George Mitchell, Harri 
Holkeri, and John de Chastelain, had a clear mandate to test the waters for arms 
decommissioning and to advise on how to work to that effect. Such mandate constituted 
itself in an implicit mediation role characterized by facilitation and formulation among 
the parties to the conflict. Moreover, the International Body’s report was also crucial in 
producing a favorable climate for future mediation—a classic mediation strategy—as 
evidenced by the six suggested principles of nonviolence and democracy that were later 
adopted by the negotiating parties. The work of the International Body was characterized 
by the institution’s neutrality in the process, unanimity in its opinion, and cooperative 
spirit among its members. As the academic Paul Arthur notes, Mitchell, Holkeri, and de 
Chastelain comprised “what might be considered a semi-autonomous Eminent Person’s 
Group.”231 
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The Office of the Independent Chairmen, which was integrated by the same three 
members of the previous International Body, exercised crucial mediation throughout the 
all-party negotiations in Northern Ireland. The chairmen helped reach agreements 
regarding the format of the talks; once their role was legitimated by the parties, the three 
members were assigned to various mediating positions throughout the peace process, 
including the chairmanship of the Plenary Committee and the sub-committees. When the 
talks moved to substantive topics, the chairmen found common ground among the 
parties’ proposals on the negotiated Strands, produced drafts for debate, and convinced 
some reluctant leaders to embrace the agreements. 
In conclusion, institutionalized mediation—as a mediation style—can be observed 
whenever the mandate of an institution created during a peace process leaves room for a 
mediation strategy, and such mediation approach is accepted—implicitly or explicitly—
by the conflicting parties. As observed, the institution does not necessarily need to have 
the explicit mandate to mediate among the parties, or be integrated by a single type of 
provider of mediation as categorized by the literature. Moreover, the presence of other 
providers of mediation in a peace process does not exclude the possibility for further 
mediation in the institutionalized form.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Academics usually analyze mediation by studying the mediators’ roles and 
behavior, and for that they use sets of categories or typologies. As Jacob Bercovitch 
points out, there are several typologies for mediators’ roles and behavior.232 The author 
comments that “to make sense of the many forms of behavior mediators may undertake, 
we [in academia] usually suggest a number of role categories that encompass related 
forms of behavior.”233 In addition, another “conception for focusing on and categorizing 
what mediators actually do is that of a mediation strategy.”234 The most useful typology, 
according to Bercovitch, is the one proposed by Touval and Zartman, which comprises an 
“ascending level of involvement that can describe the full range of mediation 
techniques.”235 
Notwithstanding the typologies already used by scholars who study mediation, 
evidence suggests that there may be another approach to study and evaluate mediation. 
The concept of what this thesis identifies as styles of mediation derives from the study of 
several mediation cases and is strongly linked to the frameworks under which the 
mediation is exercised. As this work noted, the characteristics of personalistic and 
institutionalized mediation may help analysts to compare mediation, and in some cases 
even predict—to an extent—patterns and results of mediation, based on the outcomes of 
previous cases of personalistic and institutionalized mediation. 
A. STYLES IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Personalistic mediation can be observed in the following characteristics: 
A. A high-ranking person’s motivation leads his or her country to mediate 
in a given conflict, and the mediation is largely planned and executed by 
this person. 
                                                 
232 Bercovitch, “Introduction,” 15. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid., 16. 
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B. The mediation is personally conducted by a president, special envoy, or 
through shuttle diplomacy. 
C. The mediation is largely conducted by a central and relatively 
permanent mediator throughout the process, regardless of political shifts in 
the mediator’s home country or in the conflicting parties. 
As a style of mediation, the study of personalistic mediation offers a new 
approach for describing and evaluating mediation. Considering that the “A” and “B” 
characteristics of personalistic mediation can be identified at an early stage of the 
mediation, analysts who observe their presence in a forthcoming mediation may be able 
to predict—to an extent—patterns and results of the mediation, based on the outcomes of 
previous cases of personalistic mediation. Given that the characteristic “C” may be more 
readily observable expo facto, analysts may return to this aspect of personalistic 
mediation for comparative purposes, though not so much for prediction. All three 
characteristics can contribute, on an individual or joint basis, to the creation of the style 
of personalistic mediation, which may be ultimately regarded as a framework of 
mediation that develops and establishes itself as the mediation unfolds, largely due to the 
mediators’ own work and determination. 
The institutions analyzed in Chapter III are examples of mediation because their 
mandates allowed them to adopt mediation strategies such as enhancing attractiveness of 
some alternatives (such as talks over war), also known as the compensation strategy; 
producing a favorable climate for mediation; searching for common ground among the 
negotiating parties; and facilitating and formulating agreements (such as producing 
drafts).  
In sum, institutionalized mediation may be identified by these factors:  
A. When the mandate of an institution created in a peace process explicitly 
empowers the institution to mediate in the conflict. 
B. When the mandate of an institution created in a peace process does not 
explicitly empower the institution to mediate in the conflict but the 
institution nevertheless exercises mediation between the conflicting 
parties—however limited it may be—by adopting one or more mediation 
strategies in its work, and such mediation is accepted by the parties. 
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Whichever strategy may be adopted, mediation by an institution will be also 
characterized by the importance of the institutional umbrella under which the mediation 
is exercised, as well as for the institutional unity of its actions. In addition, it may also 
present some of the characteristics of the institutions analyzed in Chapter III, such as 
neutrality and independence in the process, and division of labor and unanimity of 
opinion among its members. 
As with personalistic mediation, the study of institutionalized mediation also 
offers a new approach for describing and evaluating mediation. Given the explicit nature 
of characteristic “A,” analysts may be able to predict at an early stage, and to an extent, 
patterns and results of the mediation that is about to unfold, based on the outcomes of 
previous cases of institutionalized mediation. Since characteristic “B” may be more 
readily observable expo facto, analysts may revisit this aspect of institutionalized 
mediation for comparative purposes, though not so much for prediction. Characteristics 
“A” and “B,” as well as the existence of the institutional umbrella and unity, contribute to 
the creation of the style of institutionalized mediation, which may be ultimately regarded 
as a framework of mediation. On the one hand, an explicit mandate allows 
institutionalized mediation to unfold from the start, as long as the institutional umbrella is 
guaranteed. On the other hand, when the mandate does not empower the institution to 
mediate but the institution still adopts a mediation strategy, institutionalized mediation 
may be said to have unfolded throughout the work of the institution, and not right from 
the start. 
From a joint perspective, both styles of mediation may be present in a peace 
process, as evidenced by the Sri Lankan case. The presence of both styles of mediation 
reflects that long peace processes may tend to experience chances in mediation 
approaches, in the same manner as when mediators change their mediation strategies. 
B. STYLE AND PRACTICE 
In addition to mediation scholars, jurists can also benefit from the study of these 
styles of mediation, in particular, of the institutionalized type. Since institutionalized 
mediation is strongly linked—in most cases—to the framework under which it emerges, 
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it is possible to study the legal characteristics of the institutions created to mediate in 
conflicts. For example, the International Body in Northern Ireland was created by the 
British and Irish governments following their Joint Communiqué on 28 November 1995. 
Given that this was an organization created by two sovereign governments, several 
questions may arise, such as: What was the International Body under international law? 
Did its members have diplomatic privileges and immunities? In addition, the framework 
of the Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chair may also be studied by jurists for its link to 
international law. Policymakers, from counterterrorism analysts to diplomats, who 
welcome mediation for managing conflict may also benefit from the study of the styles of 
mediation. Because this study suggests that the styles of mediation may be linked to 
previously observed patterns and results of mediation, policymakers may find it useful to 
consider those aspects to anticipate any possible result of the mediation in question. For 
instance, policymakers may use the styles of mediation to find the most suitable mediator 
for future conflicts.  
In the case of personalistic mediation, policymakers may look for a potential 
mediator who resembles former personalistic mediators, and expect to achieve similar 
results, foresee errors, or improve specific roles and behaviors of the style. In particular, 
policymakers may seek a deeply motivated individual who is not only willing to plan and 
execute the mediation, but also be up to the demanding and high-level circumstances of a 
talks to curtail terrorism in a given state or region. In effect, being a high-ranking person 
(minister and above) and having previous negotiation skills may make the mediator more 
suitable for the work, as evidenced by the importance of these characteristics in all the 
personalistic mediation cases. In addition, relative immunity to political change (in either 
the mediator’s or the conflicting parties’ governments) also seems to have a positive 
effect on the mediation, lending consistency to the mediation and maintaining the 
momentum of the talks. For instance, Solheim is a clear example of this political stability, 
while Clinton was—in a way—limited by the time left of his presidential term. The 
equilibrium of personalistic mediation appears to be in the rank of a minister of state, 
which may be less politically volatile than a president (because a new government may 
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leave a previous minister in office or in charge of a specific task, even after political 
change), but of higher rank than a member of parliament. 
While the motivation and interest of the potential personalistic mediator are key to 
the style, policymakers should, however, consider analyzing whether these personal 
qualities accord with the official policies of the state. For instance, because mediation in a 
conflict is usually regarded as foreign policy, the mediation plans of the individual in 
question should be contrasted to the state’s foreign policy plans and principles. Moreover, 
there may be a conflict of interest if mediators are more interested in taking advantage of 
the spotlight of the mediation for enhancing their own reputation, rather than focusing to 
enhance their country’s standing in the international community. Institutionalized 
controls may be exercised to that effect; for example, a minister of state may be subject to 
parliamentary control. Nevertheless, institutionalized controls may be more difficult to 
apply on heads of government who adopt a personalistic style of mediation, because in 
most cases foreign policy falls under presidential initiative, while a minister may respond 
to the parliament more often. 
On the other hand, studying institutionalized mediation offers room for 
policymakers to bear in mind past frameworks and mandates when designing these 
aspects in future mediations. While the study of personalistic mediation appears to be 
useful for choosing suitable mediators (because this style is usually linked to individual 
mediators), previous cases of institutionalized mediation may not help policymakers to 
that extent, since evidence showed that mediating institutions can be integrated by all the 
providers of mediation, not just individuals. 
Policymakers planning to employ institutionalized mediation in a conflict should 
consider the executive capacity of the planned institution’s members. As the Sri Lanka 
and Northern Ireland cases suggest, a mediating institution may be more executive if 
integrated by individuals, and not governments. The International Body and the Office of 
the Independent Chairmen composed of three individuals seem to have been more 
executive than the Sri Lanka Donor Co-Chairs, which were composed of official 
government delegates. The executive capacity seems to be directly linked to the decision-
making processes of the providers of mediation. The more complex the decision-making 
 62 
process of the provider is, the less executive it may be mediating; therefore, mediating 
institutions composed of states or organizations may be less executive than individuals.  
Moreover, policymakers should also contemplate the importance of designing 
clear institutional frameworks. The functions and objectives of the institution should be 
clearly stated in the mandate, as well as any limits to its work. Flexibility may be granted 
to the institution when adopting a mediation strategy. Notwithstanding such flexibility, 
the mediation strategy should follow the objectives of the process and be, to that effect, 
effective in the delivery of sticks and carrots. 
C. NEXT STEPS 
Because this thesis drew conclusions on the styles of mediation based on the 
study of a narrowed set of cases linked to terrorism conflicts, it may be worth expanding 
the area of study to include other types of international mediation that were not 
necessarily linked to terrorism. Likewise, it may also be helpful to explore the suitability 
of the styles of mediation identified in this thesis in other international mediation cases.  
More research linking the styles of mediation with mediation results is also 
needed, in order to enhance the understanding of the characteristics of the styles and their 
predictive capability. In addition, new studies may compare both styles and analyze 
which one may be more suitable for different scenarios, taking into account—for 
example—the characteristics of the conflicts and of the conflicting parties. As noted in 
the section “Style and Practice,” certain legal aspects related to the institutional style of 
mediation may be worth exploring, such as the legal frameworks under which these 
institutions operate and their link to international law. 
To date, the Colombian peace process with the FARC is still ongoing, and both 
parties to the conflict are relying on international mediation to manage the conflict. While 
it is still too early to draw conclusions on the mediation undertaken in this case, the 
Colombian example shows that mediation as a conflict management approach is still 
strong at the international level. As noted earlier, the current Colombian peace process is 
the first of its kind to include significant international involvement.  
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Such an approach does not only offer new hope in the history of peace talks with 
terrorist organizations in Colombia, but also indicates that the failure of the Sri Lankan 
peace process did not inhibit other countries from choosing international mediation as a 
suitable approach for managing terrorism conflicts. Indeed, evidence suggests that 
mediation does offer a way to abate or resolve terrorism conflicts and that it is a solid 
alternative to escalating hostilities. Although mediation resolved only the Northern 
Ireland conflict, mediation helped to modulate the violence and find common ground in 
the Sri Lankan and Israeli-Palestinian cases. 
 The calls for international mediation by both the Colombian government and the 
FARC have been very strong, as well as the offering of mediation services by several 
countries in the region. International mediation in the Colombian case seems to have been 
essential, for example, in helping the parties launch talks. It will now be a matter of time 
to see how international mediation will perform overall in Colombia and how this case 
can contribute to research in the field. 
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